A visual cryptography scheme for a set P of n participants is a method to encode a secret image SI into n shadow images called shares, where each participant in P receives one share. Certain quali ed subsets of participants can \visually" recover the secret image, but other, forbidden, sets of participants have no information (in an information-theoretic sense) on SI. A \visual" recovery for a set X P consists of xeroxing the shares given to the participants in X onto transparencies, and then stacking them. The participants in a quali ed set X will be able to see the secret image without any knowledge of cryptography and without performing any cryptographic computation. This cryptographic paradigm has been introduced by Naor and Shamir 7].
Introduction
A visual cryptography scheme for a set P of n participants is a method to encode a secret image SI into n shadow images called shares, where each participant in P receives one share. Certain quali ed subsets of participants can \visually" recover the secret image, but other, forbidden, sets of participants have no information (in an information-theoretic sense) on SI. A \visual" recovery for a set X P consists of xeroxing the shares given to the participants in X onto transparencies, and then stacking them. The participants in a quali ed set X will be able to see the secret image without any knowledge of cryptography and without performing any cryptographic computation.
The best way to understand visual cryptography is by resorting to an example. Suppose that there are four participants, that is P = f1; 2; 3; 4g, and that the quali ed sets are all subsets of P containing at least one of the three sets f1; 2g, f2; 3g, or f3; 4g. Hence, the family of quali ed sets is ? Qual = ff1; 2g; f2;3g;f3; 4g; f1;2;3g;f1;2;4g; f1;3;4g;f2; 3; 4g; f1;2;3; 4gg: We will stipulate that all remaining subsets of P are forbidden.
We want to encode the secret image \ECCC". The four shares generated by a visual cryptography scheme for A are given in Appendix. They look like random patterns and, indeed, no individual share provides any information, even to an in nitely powerful computer, on the original image. To decrypt the secret image the reader should xerox each pattern on a separate transparency, stack together the trasparencies associated to participants in any quali ed set, and project the result with an overhead projector. If the transparencies are aligned carefully, then the reader will get the images showed in the remaining part of Appendix.
This new cryptographic paradigm has been recently introduced by Naor and Shamir 7] .
They analyzed the case of a k out of n threshold visual cryptography scheme, in which the secret image is visible if and only if any k transparencies are stacked together.
A possible application, mentioned in 7] , is the following. The 2 out of 2 visual cryptography scheme can be thought of as a private key cryptosystem. We encode the secret printed message into two random looking shares. One of the two shares will be a printed page of ciphertext which can be sent by mail or fax, whereas the other share serves as the secret key. The original image is revealed by stacking together the two transparencies. This system is similar to the one-time pad, as each page of ciphertext is decoded by using a di erent transparency. However, it does not require any cryptographic computation | the decoding is done by the human visual system.
In this paper we extend Naor and Shamir's model to general access structures, where an access structure is a speci cation of all quali ed and forbidden subsets of participants. We propose two di erent techniques to construct visual cryptography schemes for any access structure. We analyze the structure of visual cryptography schemes and we prove bounds on the size of the shares distributed to the participants in the scheme. We provide a novel technique to realize k out of n threshold visual cryptography schemes. Also, we consider graph-based access structures, i.e., access structures in which any quali ed set of participants contains at least one edge of a given graph whose vertices represent the participants of the scheme.
The Model
Let P = f1; : : :; ng be a set of elements called participants, and let 2 P denote the set of all subsets of P. Let De ne ? 0 to consist of all the minimal quali ed sets:
? 0 = fA 2 ? Qual : A 0 6 2 ? Qual for all A 0 A; A 0 6 = Ag:
A participant P 2 P is an essential participant if there exists a set X P such that X fPg 2 ? Qual but X 6 2 ? Qual . If a participant P is not essential then we can construct a visual cryptography scheme giving him nothing as his or her share. In fact, a nonessential participant does not need to participate \actively" in the reconstruction of the image, since the information he has is not needed by any set in P in order to recover the shared image. In any VCS having non-essential participants, these participants do not require any information in their shares. Therefore, we assume throughout this paper that all participants are essential.
In the case where ? Qual is monotone increasing, ? Forb is monotone decreasing, and ? Qual ? Forb = 2 P , the access structure is said to be strong, and ? 0 is termed a basis. (This situation is the usual setting for traditional secret sharing.) In a strong access structure, ? Qual = fC P : B C for some B 2 ? 0 g; and we say that ? Qual is the closure of ? 0 .
For sets X and Y and for elements x and y, to avoid overburdening the notation, we often will write x for fxg, xy for fx; yg, xY for fxg Y , and XY for X Y .
We assume that the message consists of a collection of black and white pixels. Each pixel appears in n versions called shares, one for each transparency. Each share is a collection of m black and white subpixels. The resulting structure can be described by an n m Boolean matrix S = s ij ] where s ij = 1 i the j-th subpixel in the i-th transparency is black. Formally, the two collections of p m matrices D t , with t 2 f0; 1g, obtained by restricting each n m matrix in C t to rows i 1 ; i 2 ; : : :; i p are indistinguishable in the sense that they contain the same matrices with the same frequencies.
Each pixel of the original image will be encoded into n pixels, each of which consists of m subpixels. To share a white (black, resp.) pixel, the dealer randomly chooses one of the matrices in C 0 (C 1 , resp.), and distributes row i to participant i. The chosen matrix de nes the m subpixels in each of the n transparencies. Observe that the size of the collections C 0 and C 1 does not need to be the same.
The rst property is related to the contrast of the image. It states that when a quali ed set of users stack their transparencies they can correctly recover the image shared by the dealer. The value (m) is called relative di erence and the number (m) m is referred to as the contrast of the image. We want the contrast to be as large as possible and at least one, that is, (m) 1=m. The second property is called security, since it implies that, even by inspecting all their shares, a forbidden set of participants cannot gain any information in deciding whether the shared pixel was white or black.
There are few di erences between the model of visual cryptography we propose and the one presented by Naor and Shamir 7] . Our model is a generalization of the one proposed in 7], since with each set X 2 ? Qual we associate a (possibly) di erent threshold t X . Further, the access structure is not required to be strong in our model.
Notice that if a set of participants X is a superset of a quali ed set X 0 , then they can recover the shared image by considering only the shares of the set X 0 . This does not in itself rule out the possibility that stacking all the transparencies of the participants in X does not reveal any information about the shared image.
We make a couple of observations about the structure of ? Qual and ? Forb in light of the above de nition. First, it is clear that any subset of a forbidden subset is forbidden, so ? Forb is necessarily monotone decreasing. Second, it is also easy to see that no superset of a quali ed subset is forbidden. Hence, a strong access structure is simply one in which ? Qual In view of the above observations, it su ces to construct VCS for strong access structures. However, we will sometimes give constructions for arbitrary access structures as well.
The Size of the Collections C 0 and C 1
In this paper we consider only VCS in which the collections C 0 and C 1 have the same size, i.e., jC 0 j = jC 1 j = r. Actually, this is not a restriction at all. Indeed, given an access structure (? Qual ; ? Forb ), we will show how to obtain, from an arbitrary VCS for (? Qual ; ? Forb ), a VCS having the same parameters m and (m), with equally sized C 0 and C 1 .
Let M be a matrix in the collection C 0 C 1 of a (? Qual ; ? Forb ; m)-VCS on a set of participants P. For X P, let M X denote the m-vector obtained by considering the or of the vectors corresponding to participants in X; whereas M X] denotes the jXj m matrix obtained from M by considering only the rows corresponding to participants in X. Now, suppose that jC 0 j = r 0 and jC 1 j = r 1 Thus, Property 2. of De nition 2.1 is satis ed. It is worthwhile to notice that the relative di erence (m) does not change when we go from to 0 . Hence, without loss of generality, in this paper we restrict our attention to VCS in which the collections C 0 and C 1 have the same size.
Basis Matrices
Most of the constructions in this paper are realized using two n m matrices, S The collections C 0 and C 1 are obtained by permuting the columns of the corresponding basis matrix (S 0 for C 0 , and S 1 for C 1 ) in all possible ways. Note that, in this case, the size of the collections C 0 and C 1 is the same and it is denoted by r. This technique has been introduced in 7]. The algorithm for the VCS based on the previous construction of the collections C 0 and C 1 has small memory requirements (it keeps only the basis matrices S 0 and S 1 ) and it is e cient (to choose a matrix in C 0 (C 1 , resp.) it only generates a permutation of the columns of S 0 (S 1 , resp.)).
We give an example to illustrate the de nitions and the use of basis matrices. In this scheme, (m) = 1=3, so the contrast is one. Let's rst look at the quali ed subsets. It is easy to check that the following values hold with regard to property 1: t f1;2g = 3 t f2;3g = 2 t f3;4g = 3; and t f1;2;3g = 3: Property 2 is easily veri ed for the forbidden sets. Finally, the sets f1; 2; 4g, f1; 3; 4g, f2; 3; 4g, and f1; 2; 3; 4g are neither forbidden nor quali ed, so the scheme is not a scheme for a strong access structure. 4 3 An (n; n)-Threshold Scheme A (k; n)-threshold VCS realizes the strong access structure with basis ? 0 = fB P : jBj = kg:
Thus, the original message is visible if any k of n participants stack their transparencies, but totally invisible if fewer than k transparencies are stacked together or analysed by any other method. In this section we recall some of the results presented in 7] for (n; n)-threshold VCS. In such a scheme, the original message is visible if and only if all n transparencies are stacked together, but totally invisible if fewer than n transparencies are stacked together or analysed by any other method.
The construction of an (n; n)-threshold VCS is obtained by means of the construction of the basis matrices S 0 and S 1 de ned as follows: S 0 is the matrix whose columns are all the boolean n-vectors having an even number of`1's, and S 1 is the matrix whose columns are all the boolean n-vectors having an odd number of`1's. In general, we will be interested in minimizing m for a given access structure. Hence, we de ne m (? Qual ; ? Forb ) to be the smallest value m such that an (? Qual ; ? Forb ; m)-VCS exists.
Let (? Qual ; ? Forb ) be an access structure on a set P of participants. Given a subset of participants P 0 P, we de ne the access structure induced by P 0 to be the families of sets 
General Constructions
In this section we will present two construction techniques to realize visual cryptography schemes for any access structure.
A Construction for VCS Using Cumulative Arrays
The rst construction we consider is based on the cumulative array method introduced in 9].
Let (? Qual ; ? Forb ) be a strong access structure on the set of participants P = f1; 2; : : :; ng. A cumulative map ( ; T) for ? Qual is a nite set T along with a mapping : P ?! 2 T such that for Q P we have that a2Q (a) = T () Q 2 ? Qual :
We can construct a cumulative map ( ; T) for any ? Qual by using the collection of the maximal forbidden sets Z M = fF 1 ; : : :; F t g as follows. Let T = fT 1 ; : : :; T t g and for any i 2 P let (i) = fT j j i 6 2 F j ; 1 j tg: (1) It is easy to see that for any X 2 ? we have
whereas any set X 2 ? Forb will be missing at least one F j 2 T. At this point we can realize a visual cryptography scheme for any strong access structure.
Our technique is based on the (n; n)-threshold VCS of Section 3. Let Z M be set of the maximal forbidden sets and let t = jZ M j. Let 
4
The next theorem holds. 
Constructing VCS from Smaller Schemes
In this section we present a construction for visual cryptography schemes using small schemes as building blocks in the construction of larger schemes. If X 2 ? 00 Qual n? 0 Qual , then let t X = t 00 X + w( b R 0 X ). We can prove that w(S 0 X ) t X ? (m) m and w(S 1 X ) t X . Using the reasoning applied to the previous case, Property 
where the second equality is satis ed up to a column permutation. Hence, Property 2. of De nition 2.2 is satis ed, too. It is easy to see that if the original access structures are strong, then so is the resulting access structure. Therefore, the theorem holds.
The construction technique employed in the proof of Theorem 4.4 does not work for general VCS (i.e., if they are not constructed from basis matrices). Suppose that we use to realize VCS for the strong access structures having bases ff1; 2gg and ff2; 3gg. To construct the collections C 0 and C 1 of a VCS for the strong access structure having basis ff1; 2g; f2;3gg we cannot just \concatenate" the matrices of the two schemes. Recall that, for M 2 C 0 C 1 , c M is the matrix in which the i-th row has all zeroes as entries if the participant i is not an essential participant; otherwise, it is the row of M corresponding to participant i, as de ned at the beginning of Section 4.2. The previous condition states that for any X 2 ? 0 Qual ? 00 Qual and for any M 2 C 1 and M 0 2 C 0 it results that w(M X ) > w(M 0 X ). Therefore, there will be always a di erence between a white and a black pixel. That is, the relative di erence will be positive. More precisely, let m = m 0 +m 00 and let m(X) = min The previous theorem states a general result on the existence of VCS for any strong access structure. For special classes of access structures it is possible to achieve a smaller value of m, as we will show in Section 6 for threshold access structures, and in Section 7 for graph-based access structures.
On the Structure of VCS
In this section we provide some useful properties of VCS. First, we investigate the case of \isolated" participants. Then, we show how to construct VCS for any non-connected access structure using VCS for its connected parts. Finally, we prove that any matrix M in the collection C 0 C 1 has to contain some prede ned sub-matrices, which we call \unavoidable patterns".
Isolated Participants
In this section we show that we do not need to consider access structures containing \iso-lated" participants, i.e., we can suppose that jXj 2 for any X 2 ? Qual . This is shown as follows. Suppose that (? Qual ; ? Forb ) is an access structure on participant set P, and suppose that x 6 2 P. Let C 0 and C 1 be the collections of matrices in a (? Qual ; ? Forb ; m)-VCS.
First, we show how to construct a VCS for the access structure (? Qual ffxgg; ? Forb ). Lemma 
Proof. Let As with the previous lemma, Lemma 5.2 can be iterated.
Non-Connected Access Structures
An access structure (? Qual ; ? Forb ) on a set of participants P is said to be connected if there is no partition of P into two non-empty sets P 0 and P 00 such that ? 0 2 P 0 2 P 00 . The next technical lemma will be used in the construction of VCS for non-connected access structures, given VCS for its connected parts. Hence the theorem follows.
The next example will help in illustrating the technique employed in the previous theorem. Therefore, the lemma holds.
We now look at a consequence of the unavoidable patterns for (2; n)-threshold access struc- Proof. Suppose there exists a (? Qual ; ? Forb ; 2)-VCS. Then for any X 2 ? 0 it results that jXj = 2. Indeed, there are no isolated participants, and hence jXj 2. On the other hand, jXj 2, since otherwise Corollary 3.5 would imply that m 4. Therefore, ? 0 is the edge-set of some graph G. We rst show that the graph G is connected. Indeed, suppose by contradiction that there exists a (? Qual ; ? Forb ; 2)-VCS and that G is not connected. Therefore, there exists a partition of P into two non-empty sets P 0 and P 00 such that ? 0 2 P 0 2 P 00 . Let fi; jg 2 ? Qual \ 2 P 0 and`2 P 00 . Because of the unavoidable patterns and since the access structure does not contain isolated participants, we have that for any M 2 C 1 the matrix M fi; j;`g] is equal, up to a column permutation, to one of the following two matrices M 0 = Finally, suppose that G is a complete multipartite graph having at least three parts. The graph G contains K 3 as induced subgraph, and, as above, m 3.
Therefore, ? 0 is the edge-set of a complete bipartite graph.
The condition of above theorem is necessary and su cient. We will see in Theorem 7.5a 1 ; : : :; a k , with the 1-st,: : :; k-th rows of the basis matrices S 0 k and S 1 k , respectively. In the previous construction, when we replace the symbols a 1 ; : : :; a k of SM with the rows of S 0 k (S 1 k , resp.) the column i of SM is expanded into an n 2 k?1 matrix referred to as the basic block B 0;i (B 1;i , resp.). We will show that the matrices M 0 and M 1 are basis matrices of a (k; n)-threshold VCS. Fix any k rows of a basic block B 0;i (B 1;i , resp.). Either these rows are the rows of S 0 k (S 1 k , resp.) and thus their \or" has weight 2 k?1 ? 1 (2 k?1 , resp.), or they contain at most k ? 1 distinct rows of S 0 k (S 1 k , resp.) whose \or" has the same weight in both basic blocks B 0;i and B 1;i . Therefore, Property 1. of De nition 2.1 is satis ed.
To prove that Property 2. of De nition 2.1 is satis ed we have to show that for any set X f1; : : :; ng of cardinality at most k ? 1, M 0 X] is equal to M 1 X] up to a column permutation. This is true since, for any i 2 f1; : : :;`g, it holds that B 0;i X] is equal to The two basis matrices are constructed by substituting 01 for a 1 and a 2 in SM to obtain S 0 and 01 and 10 for a 1 and a 2 in SM to obtain S 1 , respectively.
The resulting scheme has m = 2 dlog ne which is a considerable improvement compared to the scheme proposed in 7] when m = n. However, we will provide in Section 7 an even better construction, which is in fact optimal with respect to m. 
Example 6.5 A (3; 9)-threshold visual cryptography scheme can be constructed considering the matrix SM(9,4,3): SM = 2 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 4 a 1 a 1 a 1 a 1 a 1 a 2 a 3 a 2 a 1 a 3 a 2 a 3 a 2 a 1 a 3 a 3 a 2 a 2 a 2 a 1 a 2 a 3 a 1 a 2 a 3 a 1 a 2 a 2 a 3 a 2 a 1 a 3 a 3 a 3 a 3 a 1 3 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 5 : The above 9 4 matrix SM is described by Elias in 8] in a di erent context. (It is in fact equivalent to the classical a ne plane of order three, see for example 5], and is a special case of a general construction given in 1].) Substituting 0011, 0101, 0110 for a 1 ; a 2 ; a 3 in SM to obtain S 0 and 0011, 0101, 1001 for a 1 ; a 2 ; a 3 in SM to obtain S 1 we obtain the two 9 16 matrices: S 0 = 2 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 4 The SM matrix is a representation of a Perfect Hash Family (or PHF). Fredman and Koml os 4] proved that for any PHF it holds that l = (k k?1 =k!) log n. They also proved the weaker but simpler bound l = (1= log k) log n. Mehlhorn 6] proved that there exist PHFs with l = O(ke k ) log n. These bounds are in general, non-constructive, but in 1] there can be found some (constructive) recursive constructions for PHFs with l = O (log n) log(( k 2 )+1) : Naor and Shamir 7] showed that there exist (k; n)-threshold visual cryptography schemes with m = 2 O(k log k) log n. Our construction produces a smaller value of m than their construction, but this has been achieved by relaxing the condition that all values t X are equal as required in 7] .
The theorem provides a lower bound on m for any (k; n)-threshold VCS. 
VCS for Graph Access Structures
In this section, we study access structures based on graphs. We rst recall some terminology from graph theory. Given a graph G = (V (G); E(G)) a vertex cover of G is a subset of vertices A V (G) such that every edge in E(G) is incident with at least one vertex in A. The complete graph K n is the graph on n vertices in which any two vertices are joined by an edge. A graph G 0 = (V (G 0 ); E(G 0 )) is a subgraph of a given graph G = (V (G); E(G)) if V (G 0 ) V (G) and E(G 0 ) E(G). A clique of a graph G is any complete subgraph of G. The complete multipartite graph K a 1 ;a 2 ;:::;an is a graph on P n i=1 a i vertices, in which the vertex set is partitioned into subsets of size a i (1 i n) called parts, such that vw is an edge if and only if v and w are in di erent parts. An alternative way to characterize a complete multipartite graph is to say that the complementary graph is a vertex-disjoint union of cliques. Note that the complete graph K n can be thought of as a complete multipartite graph with n parts of size 1.
Let P denote the set of participants, and let G be a graph on vertex set V (G) = P, having edge set E(G). From G, we can de ne a (strong) access structure ?(G) = (?(G) Qual ; ?(G) Forb ) by specifying that the basis is E(G). Thus a subset X of participants is quali ed if the induced subgraph G X] contains at least one edge (and X is forbidden, otherwise). As is always the case, we are interested in the minimum value m for which such a VCS exists. We will use the notation m (G) It is easy to see that we obtain the desired VCS by this construction. Recall the graph G 6 considered in Example 7.1. It is easy to see that !(G 6 ) = 3, and thus it follows that m (G 6 ) = 3.
A modi cation of Theorem 7.3, using the well-known \splitting technique" from secret sharing schemes 3], together with Theorem 7.4, can be used to prove the following result for complete multipartite graphs. For a graph G, let (G) denote the minimum cardinality of a vertex cover of G. Given a graph G on vertex set P, for any x 2 P, de ne Inc(x) = fy 2 P : xy 2 E(G)g: Inc(x) represents the set of all vertices adjacent to v. For any participant x 2 P, let G x = (V x ; E x ) be the subgraph of G where V x = fxg Inc(x) and E x = fxy 2 E(G)g:
We will refer to G x as the star graph with centre x.
Exploiting the construction used in Theorem 4.4 we can prove the following theorem. Theorem 7.6 For any graph G, we have that m (G) 2 (G). Proof. Let X P be a vertex cover of G having cardinality (G). For each x 2 X, there exists a (?(G x ); 2)-VCS by Theorem 7.5.
Note that x2X E x = E(G), where E x E(G) for all x 2 X. Hence We have to show that the matrices S 0 and S 1 , constructed using the previously described technique, are basis matrices of a VCS for access structure (? Qual ; ? Forb where the second equality is satis ed up to a column permutation. Hence, Property 2. of De nition 2.2 is satis ed, too. It is immediate to see that the resulting scheme has contrast at least .
Let G be a graph on vertex set P of cardinality n, and de ne the access structure ?(G) as in Section 7. Recall also from Section 7 that G x is de ned to be the star graph with centre x, for x 2 P. It is not di cult to see that fG x : x 2 Pg is an (n; 2)-decomposition of G. Applying Theorem 8.1, we obtain a visual cryptography scheme for ? (G) having The previous theorem gives a (?(G); 2n)-VCS with contrast 2. Using two copies of the VCS constructed in Theorem 7.6 we would get a (?(G; 4 (G))-VCS with contrast 2, where (G) is the size of the minimum vertex cover of G. Therefore, for (G) > n=2 the (n; 2)-decomposition provides a VCS with shorter shares. Example 8.3 To demonstrate the techniques presented in Theorems 4.4 and 8.1, consider the access structure ?(C n ), where C n is a cycle on n vertices, and n 5. From Theorem 7.6, there is a (?(C n ); 2dn=2e)-VCS with contrast one. Two copies of this scheme produce a (?(C n ); 4dn=2e)-VCS with contrast two.
On the other hand, from Theorem 8.2 there exists a (?(C n ); 2n)-VCS with contrast two.
Therefore, for odd values of n 5, the decomposition construction produces a VCS with contrast two with shorter length of shares. 4 
VCS for Strong Access Structures on at Most Four Participants
In this section we give upper and lower bounds on the minimum value m (? Qual ; ? Forb ) for all strong access structures on at most four participants. We consider only connected access structures without isolated participants. The bounds on m are summarized in Table 1 .
The results are obtained as follows: Access structures 1; 2; 3; 6; 7; 9, and 10 represent complete multipartite graphs and the optimal value of m is determined by Theorem 7.5. The optimal value of m for access structures 4 and 18 is determined by Lemma 3.1 and Theorem 3.3.
Since access structure 8 is an induced subgraph of the graph G 6 , The upper bound m 3 can be obtained from Example 7.1 by applying Lemma 3.4. For the all the remaining access structures the upper bounds on m are obtained using the basis matrices given in Table 2 . For all the above schemes, we have (m) m = 1. The lower bound m 3 for the access structures 5 and 8 is determined by Lemma 5.12.
The next theorem proves that for the strong access structure 12, a VCS with m = 4 does not exist. 
Conclusion
In this paper we have analyzed visual cryptography schemes. We have extended the Naor and Shamir's model to general access structures and we have proposed two techniques to construct visual cryptography schemes for general access structures. We proved lower bounds on the size of the shares distributed to the participants in the scheme. We provided a novel technique to realize k out of n threshold visual cryptography schemes. Finally, we considered graph-based access structures giving both lower and upper bounds on the size of the shares.
